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Abstract 
After investigating gas dispersion on a cylindrical Floating Liquefied Natural Gas 
(FLNG) platform [1], this second article focuses on assessment of gas explosion by 
using Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD). Gas explosion simulations are carried 
out to evaluate the explosion overpressure mitigating effect of safety gap. The Data-
dump technique, which is an effective tool in resetting turbulence length scale in gas 
explosion overpressure calculation, is applied to ensure simulation accuracy for the 
congestion scenario with safety gap. Two sets of different safety gaps are designed to 
investigate the safety gap on the cylindrical FLNG platform, the overall results 
indicate that the safety gap is effective in reducing overpressure in two adjacent 
congestions. However, for the explosion scenario where the flame is propagating 
through several safety gaps to the far field congestion, the safety gap mitigates 
overpressure only in certain explosion protecting targets. Two series of artificial 
configurations are modelled to further investigate the explosion scenarios with more 





design in overpressure mitigation for the cylindrical FLNG platform is to balance the 
safety gap distance ratio in the congested regions.   
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1 Introduction 
Presently, engineers have been constructing increasingly more offshore projects in 
less accessible fields in more challenging environments, such as the far deeper waters 
and the fields in the arctic weather. Meanwhile, some companies at the forefront of 
technology in the oil and gas industry have been developing some new and improved 
solutions to operate the oil and gas drilling and production in the marginal fields.  
 
The Floating vessels for Liquefied Nature Gas (FLNG) and Floating Production 
Storage and Offloading (FPSO) are good examples of the new engineering 
technologies [2, 3], which replace the fixed offshore platforms and pipeline facilities 
to become the better choice for deep water oil and gas exploration. Along with the 
advantage of the storage ability, these FLNG and FPSO vessels have also the 
flexibility to be anchored and towed out at different locations in the ocean [4, 5]. 
  
However, most current FLNGs are designed as ship-shaped vessels that can only drift 
in one direction. When extreme weather conditions such as strong wind and waves 
occur, ship-shaped vessels cannot provide a stable platform due to the great hull 
deflection caused by its long ship body. Hence, during a typhoon, the wind and waves 
could lead to a maritime catastrophe. In addition, the mooring structure – turret is 





weathervaning, and the overall cost due to the construction of a turret consequently 
increases.  
 
In order to improve the stability of the FLNGs, the cylindrical shape platforms are 
conceptually designed. The symmetrically designed FLNGs not only diminish the 
fatigue loads induced by wave, but can also face the environment with same shape in 
all directions. For instance, in the arctic fields, the cylindrical shape vessels have same 
ice-breaking features for all ice drift directions, whereas the ship-shaped ones are one-
directionally operable. Economically, the need for cost-driving turret and swivel 
systems is eliminated in the circular hull design [6].  Therefore, the cylindrical 
solution, which is based on the conventional ship-shaped FLNG, provides a 
significant improvement in hydrodynamic stability and cost-effectiveness. 
 
However, regarding the development and research of cylindrical platforms, the work 
done so far focused on construction, operation studies, hydraulic and hydrodynamic 
analysis[2, 7-9], while the safety evaluations for the circular vessels subjected to gas 
explosion have been in an empty field. Additionally, the existing vessels with 
cylindrical platforms worldwide are mainly on-duty for crude oil drilling and 
production, whereas those cylindrical-hulled FLNG designed by researchers and 
engineers are still in the conceptual phase, and without gas explosion safety 
evaluations. Following up the authors’ previous investigation of the gas dispersion on 
the cylindrical FLNG [1], the aim of this paper is to perform the gas explosion safety 





study, a cylindrical FLNG platform configuration, which is composed of 12 
liquefaction unit modules with detailed equipment and piping design, is established 
and used in the gas explosion simulations. Moreover, the gas explosion mitigating 
effect of safety gap on the cylindrical FLNG platform is investigated 
 
The safety gap which is an open space, with no congestion, deliberately placed in 
between congested process areas, is one of the most effective and widely used safety 
measures. The principle behind the operation of the safety gap is that it basically 
interrupts a positive feedback mechanism in congested areas. The positive feedback 
mechanism consists of the generation of turbulence, enhanced thermal and chemical 
mixing between combustion products and reactants, higher flame speeds and thereby 
both higher pressures and even higher turbulence intensities and so on. The absence of 
obstacles in a safety gap eliminates the fluid- obstacle interaction thereby preventing 
the generation of turbulence [10].  
 
In this study, a series of gas explosions are performed on the cylindrical FLNG 
platform in order to analyze the safety gap effect on overpressure mitigation. The 
CFD based software FLACS[11], which is a strongly validated finite volume N-S 
solver tool [12-15] and has been developed continuously for over 40 years for 
consequence prediction of gas ventilation, dispersion and explosion, has been utilized 
in this study. In order to improve the FLACS overpressure calculation accuracy, the 






2 Numerical models  
Based on the prototype of the ship-shaped FLNG vessel as seen in Fig. 1, The 
cylindrical FLNG platform in this paper is modeled by using FLACS, all anticipated 
congestion - walls and decks are assumed to be rigid during the CFD simulations[11]. 
Volume Block Ratio (VBR) within a given zone in the model, is defined as the ratio 
between the total volume of the geometrical objects in that zone and the total volume 
of the zone. The homogeneous cubical grid cells are applied as the grid models in the 
explosion simulations. 
 
2.1 Ship-shaped FLNG 
The PRICO [16-18] FLNG units are used in this study. A realistic ship-shaped FLNG 
model including liquefaction trains, dehydration and mercury removal modules and 
compressors, etc. is established in detail as shown in Fig. 1.  
 






2.2 Cylindrical FLNG 
As shown in Fig. 2, the three dimensional cylindrical FLNG platform is modeled 
based on the ship-shaped FLNG. The order of the 12 modules on the cylindrical 
FLNG platform is kept the same as that in the ship-shaped FLNG, and the modules 
are organized in a U shape to fit the cylindrical hull. Consequently, the cylindrical 
FLNG platform has a more compact area with 12 modules in the same process order 
and the turret area is eliminated. One of the liquefaction trains– Module 7 is shown in 
a closer view in Fig. 3. As seen in Fig. 4, the topside modules on the platform include: 
1. Power generation (Module 1) 
2. 3 Trent gas turbines and 2 essential diesel generators (Module 2) 
3. Nitrogen package, hot oil, Mono-Ethylene-Glycol (MEG) processing and 
inlet facilities (Module 3) 
4. Boil off gas compressor and fuel gas system (Module 4) 
5. Acid gas removal unit & end flash gas compressor (Module 5) 
6. Dehydration and mercury removal (Module 6) 


















Fig. 4 Topside arrangement of the modules on the cylindrical FLNG platform 
 
 
3 Safety gap effect on gas explosion 
A series of gas explosion scenarios are then simulated on the cylindrical FLNG 
platform. The effects of different safety gaps on the platform are investigated in both 
near field and far field explosion regions. The Data-dump technique is utilized to 
improve the calculation accuracy of FLAC. 
 
 
3.1 Near field gas explosion simulation on the cylindrical FLNG platform 
On the cylindrical FLNG platform, the authors define the near field gas explosion 
region as the scenario where flames propagate through two adjacent congestions with 
one safety gap.  Two different safety gaps of 12.5m and 20m are modeled as seen in 





which includes the turbine air intake, turbine bundle removal equipment, scrubber and 
cold box on the lower level and two heat exchangers on the top levels. The detectors 
are placed on the lower level to monitor overpressures, the gas composition is 27% 
Methane, 33% Ethane, 15% propane, 19% Pentane and 6% Nitrogen.  
 
Fig. 5 Two configurations with different safety gaps in near field 
 
 
(a) 3D view of the liquefaction lower level  (b) Monitor regions 
Fig. 6 Lower level of the liquefaction train  
 
3.1.1 Application of Data-dump in gas explosion simulations on the cylindrical 
FLNG platform 
Before the comparison of different sets of the safety gaps, the Data-dump technique 
[10] is firstly applied in this study. The Data-dump is an effective tool to reset the 
turbulence length scale for gas explosion scenario with a safety gap, thereby 





filled gas cloud cases are all investigated, the overpressures before and after Data-
dump are monitored under or on the surfaces of the turbine air intake, turbine bundle 
removal equipment, scrubber and cold box, as seen in Table 1. 
 





















Turb air intake 7 6.4 10.5 10 
Turb bun removal 3.6 2.6 4.1 4 
Cold box 2.8 2.5 3.2 3.1 
Scrubber 6.2 5 11.5 10.5 
50% 
filled  
Turb air intake 6.5 6.4 9.2 9.1 
Turb bun removal 3.1 2.9 3.8 3.7 
Cold box 2.5 2 2.8 2.6 
Scrubber 5.8 4.5 10.5 9.2 
25% 
filled  
Turb air intake 3.4 2.6 4.3 3.8 
Turb bun removal 2.1 2 2.3 2.2 
Cold box 0.29 0.28 0.9 0.8 
Scrubber 1.65 1.1 5 3.9 
 
For each gas explosion simulation, the explosion results are initially dumped at the 
time when the flame exits the edge of the donor which is the module where the gas 
cloud is ignited. Then by creating a cc-file and executing a duplication command, a 
new explosion file for the receiving module is created along with the data loaded from 
overpressure results in the donor. In order to reset the turbulence length scale and 
restart the flame acceleration in the receiving module, the ignition is relocated to the 
upstream edge of the accepting module which is opposite to the donor. 
 
The comparison data of the overpressure modification percentages due to Data-dump 





decreases the overpressures recorded in the acceptor module. Specifically, for the 
12.5m safety gap scenario, the overpressure modification percentages tend to be 
below 12% except for the overpressures observed in the scrubber area. Whereas the 
overpressures are modified to larger extents in the 20m safety gap case, the 
percentage for each case in Fig. 8 is greater than the corresponding case in Fig. 7. In 
other words, the greater the safety gap size is, the more over-prediction of 
overpressure in FLACS should be amended by Data-dump technique. Therefore, in 
order to assure the overpressure calculation accuracy in safety gap modeling, the 
Data-dump is applied for all the following simulations in this study.  
 
Fig. 7 Overpressure reduction percentages after Data-dump for 12.5m safety gap 















































25% filled gas cloud
50% filled gas cloud






Fig. 8 Overpressure reduction percentages after Data-dump for 20m safety gap 
scenario with different gas cloud coverage  
 
3.1.2 Different safety gaps subjected to gas explosion under different gas cloud 
coverage  
After the application of Data-dump into the gas explosion overpressure calculation in 
FLACS, the safety gap effect on overpressure mitigation is then investigated in the 
adjacent (near field) modules – liquefaction trains. Two sets of safety gap (12.5m and 
20m) configurations are modelled, Fig. 9 gives an overview of the 100% gas filled 
simulation case with the maximum overpressure up to 9 bar.  The results indicate that 
nearly identical pressures are observed in the donor modules (the modules where 
ignition occurs on the left hand side of the safety gap) for both of 20m gap and 12.5m 
gap configurations. However, in the comparison between the 20m gap and 12.5m gap 
cases, it is seen that pressures are lower in the receiving module (modules on the other 

















































25% filled gas cloud
50% filled gas cloud






(a) Simulation case of 12.5m safety gap  (b) Simulation case of 20m safety gap  
Fig. 9 Maximum overpressures for 100% filled gas cloud spanning the modules 
separated by different safety gaps 
 
In addition, the comparison of all the 25%, 50% and 100% gas cloud filled cases is 
conducted, and the coverage percentage is controlled by manipulating the volume 
height of the gas cloud. Fig. 10 to Fig. 12 illustrate three similar scenarios where a 
reduction in the overpressure is observed in the receiving modules if the safety gap 
increases from 12.5m to 20m.    
 
Fig. 10 Maximum overpressures for cloud (100% filling) configurations with 12.5m 

























12.5m gap configuration with 100% filled gas cloud






Fig. 11 Maximum overpressures for cloud (50% filling) configurations with 12.5m 
and 20m safety gaps 
 
Fig. 12 Maximum overpressures for cloud (25% filling) configurations with 12.5m 
and 20m safety gaps 
 
It is interesting to note that overpressures near the turbine air intake and scrubber are 
higher than the observed overpressures in the cold box and turbine bundle removal 
areas regardless of the safety gap size. The main reason is that the flame propagation 
distances from the ignition in the donor to the targets of the turbine air intake and 































12.5m gap configuration with 50% filled gas cloud






























12.5m gap configuration with 25% filled gas cloud





bundle removal areas (as seen in Fig. 6(b), where the turbine air intake and scrubber 
are placed on the right hand side even further away from the ignition coming from 
left). The longer the flame path length is, the longer time the flame turbulence 
develops within the congestion, which further induces greater overpressures [19, 20]. 
Moreover, the turbine air intake and scrubber region are more congested with small 
dimension objects. Therefore, the smaller average diameter of the obstacles and 
greater congestion ratio contribute to more turbulence induced flame acceleration, 
which builds up greater overpressures as well [21, 22].  
 
In terms of the safety gap effect, it is seen that the overpressure difference between 
the 12.5m and 20m safety gap cases is more apparent in the turbine air intake and 
scrubber areas, which indicates that the safety gap reduces more overpressures where 
the flame path is longer and the average obstacle diameter is smaller and the 
congestion ratio is greater. In addition to the analysis of the safety gap effect on 
overpressure mitigation in near field, the investigation to the safety gap effect in far 
field is further conducted below. 
 
3.2 Far field gas explosion simulation on the cylindrical FLNG platform 
In order to investigate the consequence associated with the ignition of gas cloud from 
one module to the far away modules on the cylindrical platform, explosion 
simulations are performed by using varying parameters such as different gas cloud 
locations, size and ignition locations. The far field gas explosion scenario is defined as 





with same size of 140×140×10m are placed at different locations covering all the 
modules, for each gas cloud, 6 ignition scenarios occurring in the ground center of 
each module are simulated, as seen in Fig. 13. Overall, for each cylindrical FLNG 
platform, 24 simulations are carried out in the far field gas explosion investigation. 
 
And two different cylindrical FLNG platforms (as seen in Fig. 14) are modeled in 
order to compare the effect of different safety gaps on gas explosion mitigation. One 
configuration is the platform with all modules moved 10m inwards within the pipe 
rack circle to form the safety gap of 10m in North-South direction (Fig. 14(b)), while 
the other configuration has no gap between the modules and pipe rack, as seen in Fig. 
14(a).  
 
Fig. 14 shows one explosion scenario where the gas cloud is ignited in Module 10 and 
the flame propagates further to all other surrounding modules and far field ones such 
as Module 3 and Module 4. The gas explosion path going through two gaps in North-
South direction is defined as Path 1, e.g. Path 1 in Fig. 14 is distance from Module 10 
to Module 3 or from Module 9 to Module 4, whereas Path 2 is defined as the flame 
path after three gaps.  For each module, about 10 monitor points are uniformly 
allocated on the ground level to detect the overall overpressures. The recorded 
overpressures tabulated in Table 2 are averaged from the modules in the far end of the 
flame path. Table 2 and Fig. 15 illustrate the comparison results observed on the 


















(b) Modules in the cylindrical FLNG with 10m gap 
Fig. 14 Test layout of the cylindrical FLNG for gas cloud ignited in Module 10 
 
Table 1 Results of the far field gas explosion simulations 
Case no. Ignition location Gas cloud no. Overpressure without 
safety gap 
Overpressure with 
10m safety gap 
Flame propagation path 1 
1 Module 1 4 4.11 3.84 
2 Module 3 4 3.96 3.72 
3 Module 3 3 5.00 4.71 
4 Module 5  3 5.77 5.48 
5 Module 7 2 6.55 6.47 
6 Module 9 2 8.04 7.68 
7 Module 9 1 5.17 4.79 
8 Module 11 1 3.90 3.68 
9 Module 12 4 1.47 1.89 
10 Module 10 4 1.47 2.04 
11 Module 10 3 3.52 4.48 
12 Module 8 3 3.80 5.07 
13 Module 6 2 3.51 4.43 
14 Module 4 2 3.14 4.01 
15 Module 4 1 2.15 2.97 
16 Module 2 1 1.98 2.66 
Flame propagation path 2 
17 Module 2 1 2.30 2.22 
18 Module 4 1 2.47 2.03 
19 Module 4 2 3.06 2.31 
20 Module 6 2 1.72 1.67 
21 Module 8 3 2.04 1.78 
22 Module 10 3 2.37 1.97 
23 Module 10 4 1.80 1.62 
24 Module 12 4 2.18 1.76 
 
 







Fig. 15 Overpressures recorded in the far end of the flame 
 
For gas explosion flame propagating through path 1, it is seen in Fig. 15 that the 
overpressures between the two FLNG layouts have two distinct group results. 
Precisely, for simulation group case 1 to 8, the gas explosion in the configuration 
without safety gap produces greater overpressures in the far field than that in the 10m 
safety gap configuration, while the opposite observation is seen when it comes to the 
simulation group case 9 to 16, where the overpressures in the 10m safety gap 
configuration become comparatively larger. It can be explained that the gaps between 
three adjacent modules (e.g. Module 3, Module 9 and Module 10) in North-South 
direction have different distance, which results in different flame turbulence 
interruption effects. For instance, it is seen in Fig. 14(a) that the flames propagating 
from ignition point in Module 10 towards to Module 3 firstly experience a small 























Overpressures without safety gap





Module 9 and Module 3, while if the flames start oppositely from ignition in Module 
3 towards to Module 10, different turbulence path order could be seen.  
 
Unlike the flame path 1 simulations, the flame path 2 experiences the same safety 
gaps arrangement order regardless of the flame propagation direction in North-South, 
which is due to the geometrical symmetry of the cylindrical layout. Therefore, from 
case 17 to 24, the same overwhelming tendency is observed, namely, the far field 
overpressures without safety gap configuration exceeds the overpressures in the 10m 
safety gap counterpart.  
 
Overall, the arrangement order and the distance of the safety gap between the modules 
play critical roles. In order to quantify the safety gap distance and investigate its effect 
systematically, the following two sets of artificial configurations are modelled. 
 
3.2.1 Safety gaps between three congested regions 
The artificial configurations with three congestions are firstly modelled to investigate 
the corresponding explosion scenario in Section 3.2 where the flame path 1 goes 
through two safety gaps (Fig. 16). The FLACS models are mimicking tests extracted 
from the Research to Improve Guidance on Separation Distance for the Multi-energy 
Method (RIGOS)-research program [23], and the overpressure calculations for those 






In FLACS, those three modules in Fig. 16 are modelled with the same obstacle 
diameter of 19.1 mm and volume blockage ratios of 10.1%, and all obstacles are 
orientated orthogonally and regularly. The ignition locations in this study are in the 
centre of the donor on the left hand side of the configuration.  
 
8 simulation scenarios with 8 different safety gaps are set up, for all those simulations, 
the overall distance from the donor to Acceptor 2 is fixed, while Acceptor 1 is at 
varying locations in between the donor and Acceptor 2. Here, the authors define the 
safety gap distance ratio as the ratio of the Safety gap 1 distance divided by the 
distance of Safety gap 2. Overpressure monitors are positioned at regular distances 
along the axis of the donor–acceptor configurations, the safety gap distance ratio 
increases from 0.1 in case (1) to 4 in case (8), as seen in Fig. 17. 
 







Fig. 17 Overpressures in different configurations with two safety gaps (bar) 
 
It is seen in Fig. 17 that the overpressures in the farthest module – Acceptor 2 
increases when Acceptor 1 is placed  increasingly closer to Acceptor 2, the maximum 
overpressures is observed in simulation case 8 which has the greatest safety gap 
distance ratio, the main reason is that the congestion volume in case 8 is increased 
once Acceptor 1 connects to Acceptor 2, and the larger congestion volume leads to 
longer flame turbulence path, thereby increasing the overpressure generation in 
Acceptor 2. So, if the target of protection is Acceptor 2 in the farthest end, the 
solution in such case is to maximize the distance of Safety gap 2 which can 
tremendously decelerate the flame turbulence in the open space, such as the example 






For each accepting module, the overpressures in the monitor points are averaged and 
recorded in Fig. 18. Unlike the overpressure increase in Acceptor 2, it is interesting to 
note that the averaged overpressure in Acceptor 1 decreases from case 1 to 7, which is 
due to the fact that the increasing Safety gap 1 between the donor and Acceptor 1 
amplifies the flame turbulence interruption effect.  
 
Overall, depending on the overpressure safeguarding targets, different approaches are 
available in explosion mitigation. Firstly, in order to minimize the overpressure in 
Acceptor 2, the Safety gap 2 should have the greatest distance to discharge the flame 
turbulence and overpressure generation. Secondly, if the task is to safeguard Acceptor 
1, sufficient distance of Safety gap 1 should be applied. Thirdly, if it is to balance the 
overpressures in Acceptor 1 and Acceptor 2, the optimal solution is to make the safety 
gap distance ratio equal to 1, namely Safety gap 1 and Safety gap 2 have the same 






Fig. 18 Overpressures in accepting modules subjected to two safety gaps 
 
3.2.2 Safety gaps between four congested regions 
Furthermore, the second set of artificial configurations with four congestions is 
modeled to investigate the corresponding explosion scenario in Section 3.2 where the 
flame path 2 propagates through three safety gaps (Fig. 19). The obstacle diameter, 
arrangement and volume blockage ratio are same as they are in Section 3.2.1. The 
distance from the donor to Acceptor 2 is fixed, while the two congested regions in the 
middle move oppositely so that Safety gap 1 equals to Safety gap 3. As seen in Fig. 
20, 8 simulation scenarios with 8 different safety gap distance ratios are modeled, the 
safety gap distance ratio is defined as the distance of Safety gap 1 divided by the 
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Fig. 19 Congested configurations with three safety gaps  
 
 
As the simulation cases being conducted from (1) to (8) in Fig. 20, the overpressures 
in the three safety gap configuration have obvious decreasing tendency in Acceptor 2 
compared to the overpressure varying tendencies in Fig. 17.  
 
 
Fig. 20 Overpressures in different configurations with three safety gaps (bar) 
 
However, it is seen in Fig. 21 that the averaged overpressures in Acceptor 1 





case 1 to 7, which means that although the safety gaps 1 and 3 effectively reduce the 
overpressures in the farthest field (Acceptor 2) by manipulating the middle 
congestions, Acceptor 1 on the other hand is subjected to greater explosion 
overpressures. Therefore, depending on the protecting target under such 
circumstances, the arrangement of safety gaps provides different overpressure 
mitigation solutions. For example, the larger Safety gap 2 benefits Acceptor 1, such as 
case 1, whereas the greater distance of Safety gap 1 and 3 significantly mitigate the 
explosion overpressures in Acceptor 2. The balanced overpressures in both accepting 
modules would exist at the intersection point in Fig. 21 where Safety gap 2 is about 
1.5 times greater than Safety gap 1 or 3, in such scenario the overpressures are 
alleviated in both Acceptor 1 and 2, as shown in the example - case 5. 
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The investigation to the two sets of artificial configurations well illustrates the 
overpressure distribution phenomenon on the cylindrical FLNG platform in Section 
3.2.  
 
For the simulations of the artificial configurations with two safety gaps, in case 1 to 8 
of Table 2, the cylindrical FLNG platform without safety gap is the equivalent 
scenario of case 8 in Fig. 17, while the 10m safety gap cylindrical FLNG platform is 
the equivalent scenario of case 7. In those scenarios, the gas cloud is ignited in the 
donor (i.e. equivalent Module 3 on the cylindrical FLNG platform), Acceptor 1 and 2 
are equivalent Module 9 and 10. It is seen in Fig. 17 that if Acceptor 1 closely 
connects to Acceptor 2 in case 8, the overpressures in Acceptor 2 become greater than 
that in case 7. In other words, more safety gap space against Acceptor 2, as  in case 7, 
reduces overpressures in the accepting modules, which reflects the phenomenon that 
the far field overpressures are smaller on the cylindrical FLNG platform with 10m 
safety gap. 
 
However, for simulations from case 9 to 16 in Table 2, the overpressure distribution 
phenomenon on the cylindrical FLNG platforms can be explained by corresponding 
scenario 1 and 2 in Fig. 17.  
 
Comparing scenario 2 to scenario 1 in Fig. 17, the closer distance between the donor 





2 due to the greater distance of Safety gap 2. It is the equivalent scenario on the 
cylindrical FLNG platform where the ignition relocates to Module 10, but the far field 
overpressures on the cylindrical FLNG platform with 10m safety gap are greater. 
 
In terms of simulation cases from 17 to 24 in Table 2, the flame propagates from the 
edge module through three safety gaps to the farthest module, which is the equivalent 
artificial model in Section 3.2.2. The cylindrical FLNG with safety gap of 10m equals 
to the simulation case 8 in Fig. 20 where the safety gaps against the donor and 
Acceptor 2 effectively interrupt the flame turbulence and further mitigate 
overpressures in the far field. 
 
In summary, 16 different artificial configurations are numerically simulated with 
different ignition locations and gas cloud on the cylindrical FLNG platform. It is 
concluded that the 10m safety gaps on the cylindrical FLNG platform effectively 
mitigate overpressures in the far field modules in most cases. However, the exception 
is seen in some scenarios that the overpressures are increased in the far field due to 
the flame turbulence interaction with the adjacent modules. Therefore, the solution to 
balance overpressures in all far field modules, is to achieve the balancing safety gap 









As an extension of the previous paper [1] , regarding the gas dispersion simulations on 
a cylindrical Floating Liquefied Natural Gas (FLNG) platform, the same cylindrical 
FLNG is utilized in this study to further investigate the gas explosion overpressure 
mitigating effect of safety gap on the congested and confined offshore configurations. 
The gas explosion simulations are conducted by using the commercial CFD software 
FLACS, (and) both near field and far field explosion scenarios are investigated.  
 
The Data-dump technique which improves the FLACS overpressure calculation is 
applied. The overall results indicate that the larger the safety gap, the more efficient is 
the Data-dump technique to correct overpressure prediction. Therefore, the Data-
dump is utilized throughout this paper to ensure a more reliable gas explosion 
overpressure calculation for all scenarios with safety gaps.  
 
In the near field gas explosion simulations, overpressure mitigation phenomenon is 
observed by applying the safety gap into the congested regions. It is concluded that 
the increase of safety gap size results in greater overpressure reduction in the 
accepting modules, and the safety gap reduces more overpressures where the average 
obstacle diameter is smaller, the flame path is longer and the congestion ratio is 
greater. 
 
In terms of the far field gas explosion, the simulations are conducted on two 





direction. For each FLNG configuration, 24 simulations with 4 different gas clouds 
and 6 different ignition locations are carried out. The corresponding artificial models 
well demonstrate that depending on the ignition and the overpressure mitigation target 
locations, the safety gaps play different roles in reducing overpressures. Overall, in 
order to optimize the gas explosion alleviation effect of safety gap on the cylindrical 
FLNG platform, the most effective way is to balance overpressures in all far field 
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